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Abstract—Communication in the millimeter-wave (mmWave)
band has recently been proposed to enable giga-bit-per-second
data rates for next generation wireless systems. Physical layer
security techniques have emerged as a simple and yet effective
way to safeguard these systems against eavesdropping attacks.
These techniques make use of the large antenna arrays available
in mmWave systems to provide an array gain at the target
receiver and degrade the signal quality at the eavesdropper.
Despite their effectiveness, majority of these techniques are based
on line-of-sight communication links between the transmitter and
the receiver, and may fail in the presence of blockages or non-line-
of-sight links. This paper builds upon previous work and extends
physical layer security to the non-line-of-sight communication
case and randomly located eavesdroppers. Specifically, the large
dimensional antenna arrays in mmWave systems and the intrinsic
characteristics of wireless channel are exploited to induce noise-
like signals that jam eavesdroppers with sensitive receivers.
Numerical results show that the proposed techniques provide
higher secrecy rate when compared to conventional array and
physical layer techniques based on line-of-sight links.
Keywords–Millimeter-Wave, Physical layer security, Beamform-
ing.
I. INTRODUCTION
The abundance of bandwidth in the millimeter-wave
(mmWave) band enables high-speed, low latency, commu-
nication to support next generation systems [1]-[3]. These
systems rely on directional communication with large antenna
arrays to achieve sufficient link budget [4], [5]. Securing these
systems against eavesdropping and privacy attacks is one major
challenge [6]-[8].
Security in wireless communications can be mainly
grouped into cryptographic and physical layer security (PLS)
strategies, where the previous incorporates key-based ap-
proaches normally applied at higher system layers. The limited
transmit RF-chains, higher path-loss, and directional commu-
nication requirement of mmWave systems, however, makes the
implementation of classical cryptographic techniques ineffi-
cient for these systems [4], [8], [9]. For this reason, physical
layer security has emerged as a simple but yet effective way to
secure these systems and complement key-based cryptographic
techniques [6],[8], [10]. Further, the implementation of PLS in
mmWave is considered a productive strategy as it can result
in higher communication speed, narrow communication beam
and shorter transmission separation [11]. Physical layer secu-
rity techniques utilize the large antenna arrays to enhance the
communication signal (via beamforming) at the target receiver
and degrade the signal quality at the eavesdropper. Directional
beamforming, however, relies on line-of-sight (LoS) communi-
cation, and assumes the eavesdropper is not along the direction
of communication. In practice, the passive eavesdropper could
be located in the direction of communication, and, in the
case of non-light-of-sight (NLoS) communication, scatters can
enable the eavesdropper to intercept the communication signal
via multipath, hence rendering PHY layer security techniques
ineffective. Therefore, it is critical to develop PHY layer
security techniques that preserve privacy in both the LoS and
NLoS cases.
Several strategies have been adopted in the literature to
enhance the secrecy of mmWave wireless systems. Switched
array based schemes [8], [12], [13], [14] employ random
antenna subsets to induce artificial noise that jams potential
eavesdroppers in non-receiver directions. In addition to this,
the work in [8] proposed the use of prior information obtained
from sensors to opportunistically inject noise in potential
eavesdropper locations. In [15] and [16], low-complexity
PLS techniques based on analog cooperative beamforming
are proposed. These techniques enhanced the secrecy rate as
distributed antenna nodes result in narrower beamwidth and
increased artificial noise. The work in [17] built upon the
techniques in [15] and [16] and proposed a beamforming
solution with null steering. This solution is shown to improve
the secrecy performance when the eavesdropper is in close
proximity to the target receiver. Despite their capability in
enhancing the transmission secrecy, those techniques require
a LoS link to the target receiver and fail if the eavesdropper
and the target receiver paths overlap. For instance, path overlap
can occur if the eavesdropper is located along the transmission
direction of the receiver or it is in close proximity to the
receiver. Scatters close to the transmitter can cause blockages
and lead to NLoS links. Overlapped common channel paths
(as a result of NLoS links) between the receiver and the
eavesdropper increase the risk of information leakage to the
eavesdropper. To safeguard mmWave systems with possible
overlapped common channel paths with the eavesdropper, the
work in [18], [19] , [20] and [21] considered the problem of
aligned transmitter, eavesdropper, and target receiver in the
mainlobe path, i.e. mainlobe security. In [18], a dual beam
transmission technique that ensures the mainlobe is coherent
only at the target receiver’s location is proposed. The work
in [19] proposed a dynamic rotated angular beamforming
technique which uses a set of frequency offset modulator to
generate angle and range based transmission. The work in [21]
utilized channel knowledge of eavesdroppers to enhance the
secrecy rate of the target receiver. It should be noted that
eavesdroppers in general are passive and their presence is
unknown. The work in [20] proposed the use of maximum
ratio combining and artificial noise injection in the null space
of the receiver’s channel to safeguard transmission. Maximum
ratio combining, however, only increases the SNR at the target
receiver, but does not safeguard the communication link against
an eavesdropper with a sensitive receiver. Moreover, noise
injection requires complex antenna architectures which might
be impractical to implement in mmWave systems.
In this paper, we address the problem of overlapped com-
munication channel paths between the receiver and an arbitrary
eavesdropper and propose two transmission techniques that
enhance the security of mmWave systems with NLoS channels.
Unlike [18], [19] , [20] and [21], the proposed techniques
do not necessarily require a LoS channel path between the
transmitter and the receiver, and can be applied using a simple
analog antenna architecture with a single RF chain at the
transmitter. The first technique enhances secrecy by employing
a path hopping technique, while the second technique uses ran-
dom antenna subsets to beamform along multiple transmission
paths. The proposed techniques facilitate secure transmission
to the receiver without the need for complex antenna archi-
tectures and reduce the likelihood of information leakage to
potential eavesdropper with common receiver communication
paths.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a mmWave system where the transmitter
communicates with a receiver via NLoS communications paths
L > 1 in the presence of an eavesdropper. The transmitter
consists of one RF chain and N antennas and the receiver
is equipped with NR antennas. To transmit the kth infor-
mation symbol s(k), where E[|s(k)|2] = 1, to the receiver,
the transmitter multiplies s(k) by unit norm transmit vector
f = [f1, f2, f3, . . . fN ] ∈ CN , where fn denotes the complex
weight (or phase-shift) associated with the nth transmitting
antenna. At the receiver, the received signals on all receive
antennas are combined using a combining vector w ∈ CNR .
Assuming a narrowband block fading channel, the received
signal at the receiver is given by
y(k) = w∗Hfs(k) + z(k), (1)
where H represents the mmWave channel matrix between the
transmitter and the receiver, and z(k) ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the
additive noise at the receiver. Adopting a geometric channel
model with L scatters, where each scatter is assumed to
contribute to a single channel path between the transmitter
and the receiver, the channel H is given by [4]
H =
√
NNR
L
L∑
l=1
αlaR(φl)a
∗
T(θl) (2)
where φl is angle-of-arrival (AoA) at the receiver associated
with the lth angle-of-departure (AoD) θl from the transmitter,
αl is the complex gain of the lth path and aR(φl) and aT(θl)
represent the receiver’s and transmitter’s array response defined
in [4]. For ease of exposition, we assume a uniform linear array
at the transmitter and a single antenna at the receiver. Hence,
the the channel in (2) becomes
h =
√
N
L
L∑
l=1
αlaT(θl), (3)
where aT(θl) =
1√
N
[e−j(
N−1
2
)2pi d
λ
cos(θl), ..., ej(
N−1
2
)2pi d
λ
cos(θl)]
and the signal in (1) simplifies to
y(k) = h∗fs(k) + z(k). (4)
III. MILLIMETER WAVE SECURE TRANSMISSION
In this section, we introduce simple transmission tech-
niques suitable for mmWave systems with analog antenna
architecture (single RF chain). Nonetheless, the proposed
techniques can also be applied in systems with advanced
antenna architectures. The key idea is to exploit the intrinsic
randomness of the wireless channel to distort transmission to
eavesdroppers, with possible overlapping channels with the
receiver, without the need for a fully digital array or prior
channel information of eavesdroppers. With the assumption of
local scatters at both the transmitter and receiver, the receiver’s
channel becomes unique at the transmitter, i.e. function of
its location and scatters. This property has been exploited in
finger-printing and localization techniques, see example [22]-
[24] and references therein, to uniquely identify the location
of the receiver. In this paper, with the assumption of full
channel knowledge at the both the transmitter and the receiver,
we exploit this property to jam an eavesdropper with an
overlapping communication channel, i.e. eavesdropper shares
a communication path with the target receiver. Instead of
transmitting data symbols using the strongest channel path,
the proposed transmission techniques select a random set of
paths to transmit each data symbol (or data packet) to the target
receiver. With the assumption that the receiver knows a-priori
the selected transmission paths (this could be preprogrammed
in the system) the receiver receives coherent signal, whereas,
the eavesdropper receives a noise-like signal. This noise-like
signal, which we term artificial noise, is a result of the
randomized beam pattern observed at the eavesdropper. In the
following sections, we further elaborate on those transmission
techniques.
A. Enhancing secrecy with random path selection
In this technique, the transmitter transmits each data sym-
bol along a random path (or AoD). Specifically, let θl ∈ Φ be
the lth AoD towards the target receiver and the set Φ represents
all possible AoDs towards the target receiver. The transmitter’s
inter-antenna phase shifts are set as [13]
Υn(k) =
(
N − 1
2
− n
)
2pi
d
λ
cos(θl) (5)
where θl represents the lth selected AoD for the kth data
symbol. Based on this, the nth entry of the beamforming vector
f(k) (i.e. nth antenna weight) becomes fn(k) =
1√
N
ejΥn(k).
Using (4), the received signal at the receiver along AoD θl
becomes
yR(k, θl) = h
∗
f(k)s(k) + zR(k)
=
√
N
L
αla
∗
T(θl)f(k)s(k) + zR(k) =
1√
LN
αls(k)×(N−1∑
n=0
e−j(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θlej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θl
)
+ zR(k),
= s(k)︸︷︷︸
information
symbol
αl
√
N
L︸ ︷︷ ︸
effective channel
and array gain
+ zR(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
additive
noise
.
(6)
where αl is the lth path gain gain at the receiver, and zR(k) ∼
CN (0, σ2R) is the additive noise at the receiver.
Similarly, the received signal at an eavesdropper along an
AoD θE is given by
yE(k, θE) = h
∗
f(k)s(k) + zE(k)
=
√
N
L
αla
∗
T(θE)f(k)s(k) + zE(k) =
1√
LN
αEs(k)×(N−1∑
n=0
e−j(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θEej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θl
)
+zE(k)
= s(k)︸︷︷︸
information
symbol
αE︸︷︷︸
channel
gain
√
1/LNB(θl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
artifical
noise
+ zE(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
additive
noise
,
(7)
where θl ∈ Φ, zE(k) ∼ CN (0, σ2E) is the additive noise at the
eavesdropper and the random variable B(θl) (due to random
selection of θl) is
B(θl) =
N−1∑
n=0
e−j(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θEej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θl(8)
=
N−1∑
n=0
e−j(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ (cos(θE)−cos(θl)) (9)
= N
sin(N(pid
λ
(cos(θE)− cos(θl))))
sin((pid
λ
(cos(θE)− cos(θl))))
. (10)
Observe when the eavesdropper is located along one of the
AoDs in the set Φ, i.e. θE = θl, then B(θl) becomes
deterministic with the value of N . Note this event occurs with
probability 1
L
, where L is the number of paths. Hence, it is
important to have large number of paths L for this technique
to be efficient.
B. Enhancing secrecy with joint path and antenna selection
The secrecy performance of the random path selection
technique deteriorates with limited number of scatters, i.e. low
number of transmit path L. To improve the secrecy in a low
scattering environment, we propose a joint antenna selection
and path selection technique. The idea is to associate a set
of M antennas for the strongest transmission path and the
remainingN−M antennas for another randomly selected path.
For each transmit symbol (or packet), different sets of antennas
are associated with the strongest path and a random secondary
transmit path. Selecting the strongest path maximizes the
receive signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the receiver. This dual
antenna and path selection technique results in controlled
interference in both the main and secondary transmission
paths. The interference results from the contribution of the
side-lobes of each transmit beam in all paths. The random
antenna selection ensures that the side-lobe levels are perturbed
for each transmit symbol. As the target receiver is aware of
its channel, the transmit path identity, and the set of selected
antennas for each path (can be preprogrammed a priori), it is
able to decode the received symbol. As the eavesdropper does
not have knowledge of these parameters, it can not precancel
the interference due to the perturbed side-lobes. This reduces
its rate and enhances the overall secrecy rate.
Let IM (k) be a random subset of M antennas used to
transmit the kth symbol along the strongest path (AoD θS),
and IL(k) be subset that contains the indices of the remaining
antennas used to transmit the kth symbol along a secondary
path (AoD θi). The nth antenna phase shift is set as
Υn(k) =
{ (
N−1
2 − n
)
2pi d
λ
cos(θS), n ∈ IM (k)(
N−1
2 − n
)
2pi d
λ
cos(θi), n ∈ IL(k) (11)
and the received signal at the target receiver becomes
yR(k, θS, θi) = h
∗
f(k)s(k) + zR(k) =
1√
LN
s(k)×( ∑
n∈IM (k)
αSe
−j(N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θSej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θS
+
∑
n∈IL(k)
αSe
−j(N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θSej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θi
+
∑
n∈IL(k)
αie
−j(N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θiej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θi
+
∑
n∈IM(k)
αie
−j(N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θiej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θS
)
+zR(k)
= s(k)︸︷︷︸
information
symbol
1√
LN
(
αSM + αi(N −M) + βR
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
effective beamforming and
channel gain
+ zR(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
additive
noise
,
(12)
where βR is given by
βR =
∑
n∈IL(k)
αSe
j(N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ (cos θi−cos θS) +
∑
n∈IM(k)
αie
j(N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ (cos θS−cos θi). (13)
Note βR can be precalculated at the receiver since it has prior
knowledge of the channel and the transmit antenna set along
each path.
The eavesdropper can intercept the transmitted signal via
the transmitter’s side lobe or main lobe (this occurs when the
eavesdropper is located along the the transmitter’s main lobe).
We will investigate these two scenarios separately. Assuming
the eavesdropper can only intercept communication via the
side lobe, the received signal at the eavesdropper along its
AoD θE 6∈ Φ is given by
yE(k, θS, θi, θE) = h
∗
f(k)s(k) + zE(k) =
1√
LN
s(k)αE×( ∑
n∈IM(k)
e−j(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θEej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θS+
∑
n∈IL(k)
e−j(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θEej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θi
)
+ zE(k)
= s(k)︸︷︷︸
information
symbol
αEβE︸ ︷︷ ︸
effective artificial
noise
+ z(k)︸︷︷︸
additive
noise
, (14)
where the noise term βE is given by
βE =
1√
LN
∑
n∈IL(k)
ej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ (cos θS−cos θE) +
∑
n∈IM(k)
ej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ (cos θi−cos θE). (15)
From (15) we observe that the noise term βE is random
since the eavesdropper is unaware of the transmit angles θi and
θs and the associated transmit antenna sets IL(k) and IM (k).
This induces artificial noise that jams the eavesdropper. We
also observe from (14) that high channel gain αE increases
the artificial noise at the eavesdropper, hence, no significant
rate gain is expected with high channel gain.
Considering the second scenario, where we assume the
eavesdropper can only intercept the communication link via
the main lobe, the received signal at the eavesdropper along
an AoD θE = θS becomes
yE(k, θS, θi, θE) = h
∗
f(k)s(k) + zE(k) =
1√
LN
s(k)αE×( ∑
n∈IM(k)
e−j(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θEej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θS+
∑
n∈IL(k)
e−j(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θEej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos θi
)
+ zE(k)
= s(k)︸︷︷︸
information
symbol
αEβˆE√
LN︸ ︷︷ ︸
effective artificial
noise
+ zE(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
additive
noise
, (16)
where the noise term βˆE is given by
βˆE =
{
M +
∑
n∈IL(k) e
−j(N−1
2
−n)γ(θi,θE), if θE = θS
N −M +∑n∈IM(k) e−j(N−12 −n)γ(θS,θE), if θE = θi
(17)
and γ(θx, θE) =
2pid
λ
(cos θx − cos θE). From (17) we observe
that the noise term βˆE consists of a constant term and a random
term (function of transmit antenna sets and AoD). Hence, to
maintain the randomness of the term βˆE both transmit subsets
should be sufficiently large. This maximizes the randomness
of βˆE and, as a result, the artificial noise at the eavesdropper.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed transmission techniques in terms of the achievable
secrecy rate R (bits/s/Hz). It is assumed that all communication
takes place during a fixed coherence interval in which the
channel is assumed to known to both the transmitter and
target receiver. Furthermore, for ease of exposition, we take
a pessimistic approach and assumed that the eavesdropper is
aligned with one of the transmitter’s L paths.
The secrecy rate R is defined as
R = [log2(1 + SNRR)− log2(1 + SNRE)]+, (18)
where SNRR is the SNR at the target receiver, SNRE is the
SNR at the eavesdropper, and a+ denotes max{0, a}. In the
following we derive the average SNR expressions for the
proposed transmission techniques.
A. Random path selection
From (6), the SNR at the receiver can be expressed as
SNRR =
(E[αi
√
N/L])2
σ2R
=
Nα¯2
Lσ2R
=
NρR
L
, (19)
where α¯ is the average channel gain of all transmit paths, and
ρR =
(E[αi])
2
σ2
R
. From (19) we observe that the SNR at the
target receiver deteriorates with increasing number of paths.
This results as the total transmit power is spread among all
L paths and weaker links will be utilized for transmission.
However, as we will show in the derivation of the SNRE (see
(20)), increasing the number of paths increases the artificial
noise at the eavesdropper. Hence there is an optimal number
of paths L that enhances the secrecy rate.
Similar to (19), the SNR at an eavesdropper can be
expressed as (see (7))
SNRE =
1
L
(
α2EN
Lσ2E
)
+
(
1− 1
L
)(
α2E(E[B(θl)])
2/LN
α2Evar[B(θl)]/LN + σ
2
E
)
=
ρEN
L2
+
(
1− 1
L
)(
ρE(E[B(θl)])
2
ρEvar[B(θl)] + LN
)
(20)
where ρE =
α2E
σ2
E
, var[αEB(θl)/
√
LN ] = α2E/LNvar[B(θl)]
represents the artificial noise variance, θl ∈ Φ, and
E[B(θl)] =
N
L
L∑
l=1
sin(N(pid
λ
(cos(θE)− cos(θl))))
sin((pid
λ
(cos(θE)− cos(θl))))
, (21)
and
var[B(θl)] = E[B(θl)
2]− (E[B(θl)])2. (22)
The first term of (20) captures the eavesdropper SNR when it
is aligned with one of the transmitter’s AoD, i.e. θE = θl. This
occurs with probability 1/L as it is assumed that θE overlaps
with one of the receiver’s AoDs, and there are a total of L
AoDs. The second term of (20) captures the eavesdropper SNR
when it is not aligned with the transmitter’s AoD, i.e. θE 6= θl.
This occurs with probability 1 − 1/L. It is not difficult to
observe from (20) that the eavesdropper’s SNR deteriorates
with increasing number of transmission paths.
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(b) L = 12 paths
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(c) L = 24 paths
Proposed (path and antenna selection)
Proposed (path selection)
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Conventional array
Fig. 1. Secrecy rate versus the eavesdropper’s angle of departure θE for
different number of transmission paths; N = 32 transmit antennas, ρR = 10
dB, and ρE = 15 dB.
B. Joint path and antenna selection
Using (12), the SNR at the target receiver can be expressed
as
SNRR =
(E[αsM + αi(N −M) + βR])2
LNσ2R
(23)
=
α2sM
2
LNσ2R
+
(α¯(N −M)2
LNσ2R
+
(E[βR])
2
LNσ2R
, (24)
where α¯ is the average channel gain of all transmit paths,
excluding the strongest path.
Similarly, using (14) and (16), the SNR at the eavesdropper
can be expressed as
SNRE=
2
L
(
α2E(E[βˆE])
2
LNσ2E
)
+
(
1− 2
L
)(
α2E(E[βE])
2
α2Evar[βE] + LNσ
2
E
)
=
2ρE(E[βˆE])
2
L2N
+
(
1− 2
L
)(
ρE(E[βE])
2
ρEvar[βE] + LN
)
, (25)
where the expectation is over all transmit antennas and AoDs.
The first term of (25) captures the eavesdropper SNR when it
is aligned with one of the transmitter AoDs, i.e. θE = θs or
θE = θi, and θi, θs ∈ Φ. This occurs with probability 2/L. The
second term of (25) captures the eavesdropper SNR when it is
not aligned with the transmitter’s AoD, i.e. θE 6= θi, θs. This
occurs with probability 1− 2/L. It is not difficult to see that
(E[βˆE])
2 < N2 in (25), and hence the first SNR term is lower
than the first SNR term in (20).
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(b) N = 32 antennas
Switched array
Conventional array
Proposed (path and antenna selection)
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(a) N = 16 antennas
Fig. 2. Secrecy rate versus the eavesdropper’s angle of departure θE; L = 12
transmit path, ρR = 10 dB, and ρE = 15 dB.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we conduct numerical simulations to eval-
uate the efficacy of the proposed techniques. We consider a
setup where a transmitter is communicating with a receiver
in the presence of an eavesdropper. Both the transmitter and
receiver are unaware of the eavesdropper’s location. In this
setup, the transmitter is equipped with a uniform linear array,
with half wavelength separation, and the transmitter, receiver
and eavesdropper have perfect knowledge of their channels.
To benchmark the performance of the proposed techniques,
we compare the secrecy rate achieved by the proposed tech-
niques with the secrecy rate achieved when using conventional
transmit antenna array, i.e. no action is taken at the transmitter,
and the switched array technique proposed in [13] since it can
be applied on analog antenna architectures. For all setups, we
assume that the strongest transmit path to the target receiver
is along a fixed AoD θR = 40 degrees, i.e. θR = 40 ∈ Φ,
and the remaining entries of Φ are randomly selected from
the set [1, 180] degrees. The channel gains are assumed to be
normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance. Both
the conventional array and switch antenna techniques always
transmit along AoD θR = 40 degrees. When simulating the
joint angle and antenna selection techniques, we assume that
the secondary link is selected from the set of LS = 5 strongest
paths and M = N/2.
To examine the performance of the proposed techniques,
we plot the achievable secrecy rate when using the proposed
techniques versus the eavesdropper AoD θE in Fig. 1. For all
cases, we observe that the secrecy rate is higher when the
eavesdropper AoD θE does not overlap with the transmission
AoD θR = 40 degrees. However, when θE = 40 degrees, i.e.
the eavesdropper is located along one of the transmission path
to the target receiver, we observe that all techniques suffer
a performance hit, with the conventional technique and the
switched array technique achieving zero secrecy rate for all
values of L. The proposed path selection technique is shown to
achieve higher secrecy rate for higher number of paths while
the proposed path and antenna selection technique achieves
the best performance for all cases. The reason for this is
that for low number of paths, the probability of intercepting
a direct link when using the path selection technique is
higher. This reduces the secrecy rate. The proposed path and
antenna selection technique achieves the best performance as
it randomizes both the transmit angle and antennas associated
with each angle, thereby resulting in higher artificial noise at
the eavesdropper.
In Fig. 2, we examine the effect of the number of transmit
antennas on the secrecy rate. For all techniques, we observe
that increasing the number of antennas increases the secrecy
rate and the proposed techniques achieve non-zero secrecy
rates at θE = 40 degrees. This is achieved as higher number
of antennas result in narrower beams and increased number of
sidelobes. The increased number of sidelobe levels increases
the variance of the artificial noise. The path selection technique
is shown to achieve lower secrecy rate when the eavesdropper
is not located along the main transmission path θE 6= 40
degrees. This rate loss is experienced as the path selection
technique does not always use the best transmission path, but
rather, it transmits along a set of paths, which contain weaker
paths, to enhance the secrecy rate of the system.
To investigate the effect of the eavesdropper channel
strength on the secrecy rate, we plot the secrecy rate versus
the eavesdropper’s average channel gain to noise ratio ρE
when the eavesdropper is located along the transmitter’s AoD
θE = θR = 40 degrees in Fig. 3, and when the eavesdropper is
located along the transmitters sidelobe, i.e. θE 6= θR in Fig. 4.
When the eavesdropper’s communication link is weak, Fig. 3
shows that all techniques achieve high secrecy rate. However,
when the eavesdropper channel is stronger, the performance
of both the switched-array and conventional array techniques
plummet to zero, while the performance of the path selection
technique deteriorates at a slower rate and the joint path and
antenna selection technique deteriorates at a much slower rate
as it achieves a higher artificial noise. When the eavesdropper
is not located along the transmitter’s AoD, Fig. 4 shows
that all techniques, except the conventional array technique,
achieve high secrecy rate. The proposed joint path and antenna
selection technique achieves the highest secrecy rate as it
randomizes both the transmit AoD and transmit antenna sets,
followed by the switched-array technique, and the proposed
path selection technique. The path selection technique achieves
a lower secrecy rate as it uses all paths (with potentially
weaker paths) for communications, while the path and antenna
selection technique always uses the strongest path and an
auxiliary path for transmission. This results in a higher secrecy
rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper addressed the problem of PLS in the presence of
an eavesdropper with overlapped channel paths with the target
receiver. Two transmission techniques suitable for mmWave
systems with analog antenna architectures are proposed. Both
techniques use random transmission paths, instead of a single
or all paths, for data transmission. This results in noise-like
signals at an arbitrary eavesdropper and improves the secrecy
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus ρE; N = 32 transmit antennas, ρR = 10 dB,
and L = 12 paths. Eavesdropper is located along AoD θE = 40 degrees.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate versus ρE; N = 32 transmit antennas, ρR = 10 dB,
and L = 12 paths. Eavesdropper is located along AoD θE = 55 degrees.
of the communication system. Numerical results show that
in the presence of scatters, the proposed techniques achieve
significantly higher secrecy rate when compared to conven-
tional and switched array techniques. Note that the proposed
techniques require the number of paths L > 1. For single
path, i.e. LoS link, passive relays can be used to increase the
number of transmission paths and induce randomness in the
communication channel.
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